Interview by the Chief of the General Staff to B92 TV station
Tuesday, 2.12.2008 | Interviews
I could no longer promote partnership with KFOR Commander at the moment when KFOR performs a task which, in our opinion, is not in accordance with Resolution 1244. That is why I cancelled meetings at that level with KFOR HQ, but, on the other hand, it is very important that we understand that the situation in the field is changing, that something is still going on there, that those Kosovo Security Forces are being established. We are angry, but this anger must not be to our own detriment.
B92: During the next two days, NATO foreign ministers will talk about Kosovo. As NATO spokesman has stated, the Serbian initiative to modify the Kumanovo Agreement has not been discussed yet, but NATO foreign ministers have been informed about that. Idea concerning the revision of the Kumanovo Agreement, which has been interpreted as capitulation after the NATO bombing, was first heard from the Chief of the General Staff, and then from the Serbian president, Mr. Tadić. As stated, it was about abolishing the Ground and the Air Safety Zones. Why and what is the effect of abolishing the buffer zone is the key question for our guest in ‘Kaziprst’. Good morning, thank you for being with us. Mr. Ponoš, James Apaturaj did not openly say that foreign ministers would talk about the revision of the Kumanovo Agreement, i.e. the Serbian initiative to change the Agreement in some parts. Do you expect that there will still be discussions about that issue during the next two days?
Ponoš: I initiated the issue of the revision of the Kumanovo Agreement some ten days ago in Brussels and elaborated on it at the meeting with Admiral Fitzgerald last week in Naples. Ten days altogether is not enough time to expect a reaction at the ministerial level and to change agenda of their meetings, so I am not optimistic it will be one of the topics at the meetings at that level. However, it is important that the initiative has been registered, it has entered the system and naturally, what follows is political consultations. My task and my idea was to raise the issue at the military level, with people whom I communicate to, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Craddock, and the Commander of the Allied Joint Force Command Naples, Admiral Mark Fitzgerald.
B92: We read from the news that you said that there was a possibility that experts could meet in the upcoming two weeks. What experts?
Ponoš: I proposed that to General Craddock, that it was the best way to start the process, to gather experts from both sides and discuss what changes would make sense, and what would be military reasonable and acceptable to both sides. That means that I count on NATO military structures, SHAPE, and officers form the SAF General Staff.
B92: Whose idea was that in the first place, the idea to revise the Agreement?
Ponoš: The issue has been present in the General Staff, in expert circles, as a problem that needed to be discussed, because the situation was simply untenable. The issue was raised in an appropriate political moment, of course, the military cannot raise a subject independently, we can make a proposal to those who have the authority and political power to say ‘It is time’.
B92: And who assessed when was the right political moment?
Ponoš: The president of Serbia, of course.
B92: And then you officially brought up the idea?
Ponoš: That is correct, because I have the authority to talk with NATO military structures and that is what I did. My visit to Brussels was not about that issue, I attended the session of the Euro Atlantic Partnership Military Committee, and there I gave a presentation on cooperation between the SAF and KFOR. That was an opportunity to point out everything that was good during all these years since 1999, and also what was bad, and to point out that we faced damage control in some aspects. When I say that, I mean that KFOR entered into a process of building or assisting in building of the so called Kosovo Security Forces and I pointed out the need for some things to be changed in the field, in this case, along the administrative boundary line on our side.
B92: We have not heard the NATO opinion about that idea, but when you presented the idea, I suppose at the meetings, did they nod, did they agree?
Ponoš: The generals showed understanding because I used military reasons, so to say. My argument was that the situation in the field had been changed, lets say…
B92: What?
Ponoš: …Kosovo and Metohija administrative line. The fact is that the Ban Ki Mun report was accepted and now UNMIK is being reconfigured, EULEX is coming, we have a new security constellation in that sense. Another fact is that the so called Kosovo Security Forces are being established, with NATO participation. A new security entity is emerging, one that had not been anticipated at the time of signing of the Kumanovo Agreement and UN Resolution 1244. The situation is that after all these years that we, i.e. SAF and before that Serbian and Montenegrin Armed Forces, managed to build a relationship based on trust with NATO in Kosovo and Metohija, i.e. KFOR. Since 1999, when we were two opposed parties, in war, we managed to create a situation where we jointly organized sports events, conducted joint patrols. All that indicated a high level of confidence and understanding, i.e. the part of the story that relates to what was happening in the field. If so, is there really a need to have some buffer zone between such forces?
B92: All right, but what does the buffer zone have to do with, for example, to be specific, establishing of EULEX?
Ponoš: Well, EULEX was neither anticipated nor discussed at the moment of signing the Kumanovo Agreement and Resolution 1244. I am talking about the change of the security constellation that occurred during these past ten years, and many things have changed. The perception of Serbia in the West has changed and probably the perception of the West in Serbia, as well. We are facing a control of emotions and they are facing the need to control the inertia of politics that was present during all those years. The political aspect of the entire story is that, in the meantime, Serbia acceded to Partnership for Peace. Partners should not have military buffer zones between each other.
B92: But you say that we no longer have the partnership relations with NATO as we used to have?
Ponoš: I said that I could no longer promote partnership with KFOR Commander at the moment when KFOR performs a task which, in our opinion, is not in accordance with Resolution 1244. That is why I cancelled meetings at that level with KFOR HQ, but, on the other hand, it is very important that we understand that the situation in the field is changing, that something is still going on there, that those Kosovo Security Forces are being established. We are angry, but this anger must not be to our own detriment.
B92: Do you consider those KSF as a threat to Serbia?
Ponoš: No, at this moment everything that they imply… to our knowledge, establishing those security forces, of 2500 lightly armed personnel, that means they are more gendarmerie type forces than military, but with the possibility to grow into 5000 personnel in the foreseeable time, if that is conducted in accordance with the Ahtisaari plan, and to evolve into something that would certainly be unacceptable.
B92: What is unacceptable?
Ponoš: Well, it is not acceptable that some new security forces in the region, that are not foreseen by any regional agreement on arms control or some wider context of the arms control in the region should be established, regardless of whether it is 5.56 or 7.62 caliber or some bigger, there is some new formation wearing uniforms…
B92: All right, that means that you actually do not believe that NATO-KFOR-the international forces would prevent establishing Kosovo Army?
Ponoš: We cannot engage in guessing what if. At this moment, we have a problem which is politically unacceptable for Serbia, because it is not endorsed by Serbia, unlike the EULEX mission, which comes as a mission endorsed by Serbia. In fact, there are two processes, the processes of UNMIK reconfiguration and of coming of EULEX are conducted with participation of Serbia, which provided its opinion, it has been acknowledged in line with Resolution 1244, but the establishment of the so called KSF was not done in consultation with Serbia, but on the basis of the Ahtisaari plan. This is not acceptable for Serbia, and we continuously point out that it is not a way to build partnership.
B92: All right, and now you request that the buffer zone should be abolished? What is the effect and what does it mean?
Ponoš: We want to have an active role in the entire process, and this is a part of that active role.
B92: What does an active role mean?
Ponoš: The active role is, as I have said, the story where we oppose it, we are angry, but the situation is still developing in that direction and we still have a static role and we are still angry. This is simply not politically wise, that is why we want to have an active approach, so we say - There is something happening ten years after the war, and we think that the requirements have been met to change provisions of the agreement that regulated the procedures on either side of the ABL. I do not know if our citizens are aware of the fact that it is not only that we do not have the full sovereignty over our southern province Kosovo and Metohija, which covers a certain percentage of the Serbian territory, we actually do not even have, in full sense, the sovereignty over as much territory when we look at the size of the Air Safety Zone, where our fighter planes cannot fly. After all relaxations, such procedures are still enforced. We can only fly helicopters up to 5 km and even then, they can only be lightly armed, 7.62, and even if it is a medical helicopter, the flight has to be approved by the KFOR Commander. After ten years, it is something that cannot remain, it cannot be politically justified and interpreted as partnership.
B92: What is the effect of the abolishment of the buffer zone in the military sense? What does it practically mean?
Ponoš: In the military sense, it means full freedom of movement and full sovereignty over that part of the Serbian territory.
B92: So the sovereignty up to the border, the administrative crossing?
Ponoš: That is not…yes, up to the administrative line.
B92: Which means what, you are going to…?
Ponoš: It means that we can deploy our military forces, move, fly our aircraft up to that line without asking the KFOR Commander for any permission, because, as you would agree, it is not natural that KFOR Commander should have authority, not only over the territory of Kosovo, but also outside the line in the 25 km depth, ten years after the war. Imagine Europe in 1955 and a situation where provisions of some agreements made at the end of the war were still implemented, and compare the authority of the KFOR Commander today, ten years after the war, with the authority of, say, general McArthur in Japan several years after the war, it simply makes no sense.
B92: Why is it important that you have the control in that buffer zone, in terms of security?
Ponoš: Well, because it is a volatile area, it is widely known that there are no security problems in Kosovo and Metohija or on our side of the ABL that strictly remain only on that side. Every time there is security turmoil, it overflows. Finally, the nature of those security problems is such that they are not conventional military threats, it is organized crime, religious extremism and other forms of extremism. And there are always both legal and illegal businesses developing along borders and along administrative lines, as well. The important thing is that Serbian institutions are capable of…
B92: Is it a military job to control organized crime and such?
Ponoš: Indirectly, as the second line of defense, yes, it is, just as KFOR job in Kosovo is to fight all risks when UNMIK, until now and EULEX, from now on, cannot manage them. Actually, we used to have such situation in 2000, when there was a rebellion in the Ground Safety Zone, when our forces got the authority to enter the GSZ, because on the other side, NATO was aware that the option of having one area not controlled by the military, but only lightly armed police was a great risk to security on the other side of the ABL too. I think that we have a good offer to make to the other side, we offer cooperation…
B92: And who is the other side in this case, is it KFOR?
Ponoš: KFOR, of course.
B92: What is the offer?
Ponoš: We offered them to raise the level of cooperation and we will do that if we do not look at each other from the distance of 5, 10 or 25 km, to ask approval so we can move our forces in that area. Of course, it does not imply directly that we intend to bring five battalions there, there is no such need, but simply, it is not normal to have limits in that zone ten tears after the war.
B92: Yes, but say that the security is volatile, but relatively peaceful, and that Serbia is perceived differently by the west then it was in 1999. What are your predictions, if it is important to you to come out to the administrative line? What are the prognoses or predictions of the military, if it is important to you to bring the military to the administrative line?
Ponoš: It is certainly very important to us that the SAF can control the Serbian territory and in this case, the political sense and tactfulness tell us that the control can reach the ABL. That is also a sovereignty issue.
B92: But why did you not request that in 2007?
Ponoš: It was probably not politically possible at that moment; we did not have such political momentum. We believe that we have patiently built our position over the past years, built quality and reliable relations with our European and Euro Atlantic partners, with Brussels in both cases, of course. And we have demonstrated everywhere, in practice, that we observe the assumed international obligations. In the past four years we have not had a single, even unintentional violation of that line on our side, there have been some on KFOR side, but we have understanding even for that, they change their forces each 6 months, and deploy new contingents.
B92: What is your security assessment?
Ponoš: It is possible to control security situation in Kosovo and Metohija, I have just mentioned the security risks I see there. You have probably noticed that I have not mentioned a single pure military threat or a need to resolve it by the military, any military, not even KFOR, inside Kosovo and Metohija, because the situation can be controlled politically and by security agencies and police, because of the nature of such problems. It can be the same on this side; however, if someone can gain political profit by causing a problem, then the problem can escalate into something much bigger. Actually, we have had such experience. If, in foreseeable time, ordinary people become aware that, after ten or twelve months, the self-proclaimed independence brought no change in the quality of their lives, they will realize that they cannot live purely on independence. If institutions are not functional, if the unemployment rate remains high, we cannot rule out the possibility of the political authorities redirecting attention of the ordinary population to some security problems; after all, we have had such experiences not only in that region, but also in many other regions in the world.
B92: Is that your military assessment?
Ponoš: It is one of the possibilities we point out to and it is very important to have full and open cooperation with international forces and military and civilian actors in Kosovo and Metohija in order to control such things.
B92: How, in what way would the military control that area? Would they enter the North of Kosovo or not?
Ponoš: At this moment, this is certainly not a subject of discussion. As I have said, we should be tactful and politically realistic. What can we do at this moment? If we regain, to use that rather strong word, the sovereignty, full sovereignty over that part of our territory, of 25 km in the depth of the southern part of the central Serbia, up to the administrative line itself, that alone would be a big step, we have not had a full sovereignty there for ten years.
B92: All right, it is 5 km now, as far as I understand.
Ponoš: Well, yes, but KFOR Commander still has the authority to say that he will not allow something or to bring back everything to the beginning. As I have said, our Air Force cannot fly even in this 25 km zone.
B92: What kind of communication do you have with KFOR Commander now, and also with NATO leaders, having in mind that the level of communication was reduced after the decision…?
Ponoš: I think that it was a misunderstanding. I cancelled high level meetings with KFOR Commander, which was a direct message because of the KFOR engagement. Our relations are complex, not limited to relations with KFOR only; we are also a member of the Partnership for Peace. Therefore, I maintained communication in Brussels with the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Admiral Di Paola, with SACEUR, General Craddock, and the Commander of the Allied Joint Force Command Naples, Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, but not with KFOR Commander. However, we still have technical possibilities to communicate, we have the established protected lines from my office to his and in case of any problem, we can just pick up the receiver and talk.
B92: It means that your visit to Brussels was part of the regular activities, but not bringing back the previous level of communication?
Ponoš: But my visit to Naples was not part of the regular activities, and that is why I accepted the meeting with KFOR Commander’s superior, Admiral Fitzgerald, and KFOR Commander also participated in the meeting.
B92: All right, but how do you intend to discuss the idea concerning the Ground Safety Zone if you do not have communication?
Ponoš: Well, of course I do. As I have said, I have invited the expert team from NATO HQ to come; they are two levels above KFOR.
B92: You say that the Armed Forces are making security assessments on what could happen and that you now have such prediction by 2015. Does the prediction include the possibility that Kosovo Security Forces could grow into Armed Forces?
Ponoš: There are security assessments that indicate that the situation in Kosovo and Metohija and around it will remain volatile in an extended period of time, that the presence of international military forces is necessary to keep the situation under control, that it is important to us to have partnership with those military forces and good relations in order to avoid local forces evolving into something that would be difficult to control, something that would disrupt the security in the entire region. Nothing that could happen there would remain only within the administrative line. What is the point? Simply, security problems usually come as a result of some social problems. It is not realistic to expect that the living standards, stabilization of any local institutions, education level, inter-ethnic tolerance in Kosovo and Metohija would soon change.
B92: What is actually the strategy, in the military-political sense, of the initiative to abolish the buffer zone? What is the final goal?
Ponoš: We should not discuss the final goals; after all, nothing is finite. We are talking about the direction, and I think that we have a good direction.
B92: And what is that direction?
Ponoš: The direction means building good relations with Europe, with Brussels, in this case with NATO as well, not only with the European Union, through the partnership, for which we have obtained references with our conduct during he past ten years, and by sharing the responsibility for the security situation in the field. We want to play an active role in that, it is our right, it is about our lives, our destiny.
B92: But how do you mean to build confidence if you do not have trust in NATO, because NATO assists in establishing KSF?
Ponoš: The point is that they are doing something that we do not think is in accordance with Resolution 1244, and we are indicating that.
B92: What is the difference between…?
Ponoš: Well, we have been insisting on transparency in what they do, even if it is contrary to our positions, to see whether there is any sense or legal basis to do so. Staying aside is not a solution. As I have said, we are saying: We would like to know what is going on, so that we can act accordingly. We expect transparency from NATO because we act transparently.
B92: Is the abolishment of the ground zone the only change in the Kumanovo Agreement that you request, or you intend to propose changes to some other parts of the Agreement?
Ponoš: We have two zones, we have both ground and air zones and very broad authorities of KFOR Commander to bring all things back to the starting positions in 1999, and that is the serious problem. Of course, there are things that pertain to the security of civil flights, the issue of the civil flights control over both the territory of the southern part of the central Serbia and the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. Before the war, we used to have radar on Kopaonik that was destroyed in the war, and the radar has not been brought back there, we have not had understanding from NATO concerning that, and we point out that it is not a military issue; it is an issue of political good will.
B92: And is the authority of NATO Commander a political or military issue?
Ponoš: It is both; NATO is more than military organization.
B92: As a matter of fact, you request that the authorities that we agreed on should be abolished?
Ponoš: It is not about abolishing the authorities; it is about revising parts of the agreement that do not make sense anymore, after ten years.
B92: It means that it does not make sense that KFOR Commander should…
Ponoš: …regulate, have any authorities on this side of the administrative line. Of course, that is our starting position, we will see how far we will go through discussions, I cannot predict the outcome, but I do think that, at least in the military part of NATO, there is understanding that our requests are grounded, sensible, justified. We will see whether there will be understanding and good will in NATO political structures.
B92: If the SAF want the Air and Ground Safety zones abolished, and to reach the administrative line, to regulate their action and forces there by themselves, does it mean that you have an assessment or prediction or idea that we have some security threats against our country from there?
Ponoš: It would be the same if you asked me why we need sovereignty and freedom in accordance with the international standards for the SAF along the Drina River, or along the Romanian or Bulgarian border. Does it mean that we are threatened from there?
It does not mean that, it is not implied, but that is a question of sovereignty in case of any country.
B92: But why is it important to you, as a soldier?
Ponoš: Because we do not have it there, the soldier’s job is to secure a sovereignty of their country in the part where it does not exist. At this moment, it makes sense to request that along the administrative line.
B92: What about the increase of the number of personnel that was announced, does it coincide with emerging KSF or is it an idea that does not have anything to do with any circumstances?
Ponoš: It has to do with that, as well, of course.
B92: What does it have to do with that?
Ponoš: As I have said, establishment of any military structure, although as I have mentioned, it is not a serious military structure, disturbs the regional balance of forces, and that is something which should require consultations with Serbia or asking for our opinion, whether it is the right thing. After all, it is completely unacceptable to us that it should be performed on the basis of the Ahtisaari plan; to us it is simply unacceptable framework, both politically and legally.
B92: All right, but Kosovo has been recognized by several countries and it builds its internal organization. Why is it…?
Ponoš: The fact that it has been recognized by several countries still does not mean that…
B92: 52 countries.
Ponoš: Yes, Kosovo does not have a chair in the UN, but let us leave that aside now. Establishment of such forces is not as military important as it is politically, it sends a political message…
B92: What kind of message?
That it is a state, that it has institutions, one of the characteristics of a state is the monopoly on the use of force. The paradox of the situation will become clear from the fact that once that forces are created, the so called state will not have the monopoly on the use of force, the key to it will still be held by someone outside Pristina.
B92: Well, what kind of message is that to you, as a soldier?
Ponoš: I am talking about political…after all, it is not my decision to increase the armed forces, it is a matter of political assessment of the President of the Republic. Just as that is a political message, that some forces are being created there, this too, is a political message that Serbia can react, that Serbia will play an active role both in a situation when it is asked for an opinion, and participates in something, but also in a situation when it does not participate. As I have said, in the case of UNMIK reconfiguration, Serbia was active in that process, and now Serbia has been left outside of the process.
B92: What kind of political message are we sending when we increase the number of military personnel? I saw in one of your assessments that, among other things, we are sending a message.
Ponoš: We are sending the message that Serbia will, in any case, whether it participates in the political process, discussions or not, play an active role and take care of its own destiny.
B92: And what does the active role mean in the military sense?
Ponoš: The active role means that we, in the context of neutrality, which is currently, in a way, the Serbian foreign or military policy, cannot rely on allies; it means that you need to have your own resources. You cannot build the so called niche capabilities where you have something, while you rely on your allies to provide what you do not have. We do not have an ally at this moment; it is simply not the official policy. If you do not have that, you have to get everything yourselves, it costs, and the cost is the increased number of personnel.
B92: Does the prediction of what could be happening until 2015, in terms of security, include consideration of division of Kosovo, and the possibility of the division of Kosovo or participation of the Armed Forces in that?
Ponoš: As long as it is not the official state policy, the Armed Forces cannot make plans in accordance with that. All our plans are based on the official state policy, and as you know, division of Kosovo is not an official policy.
B92: But I am asking you about the prediction, not the official policy, is there such a possibility?
Ponoš: The Armed Forces are outside the foreign policy, and we predict what the others will do, not what the Serbian government will do.
B92: All right.
Ponoš: We should know what the government does in Serbia.
B92: And do you know that?
Ponoš: Of course.
B92: Mr. Ponoš, the division of Kosovo is being frequently mentioned in the political circles these days, and it is being connected to EULEX, even this revision of the Kumanovo Agreement is being put into that context in Kosovo. However, we read assessments of several politicians from this region that division of Kosovo could mean war. I ask you as a soldier: Do you think that it could mean that, among other things?
Ponoš: Well, any option where I should guess what something should mean is simply unacceptable, given my current position. If I were a university professor, then I could accept such kind of conversation.
B92: Mr. Ponoš, the budget rebalance cut money for the Armed Forces by 3 billion dinars. What kind of information do you have regarding the defense budget, in the light of the proclaimed general reductions?
Ponoš: The predictions are not optimistic. There is some information that has already appeared in the media that it will be around 71 billion or around 806 million euros. That is a reduction by around 60 million euros, compared to the defense budget for 2008, which is certainly not good.
B92: And how do you plan to increase the Armed Forces with the reduced budget?
Ponoš: Well, I would also like to know how that can be done with the reduced budget.
B92: And what does it tell you, as the Chief of the General Staff, how will you act in the upcoming period, what will be your capabilities?
Ponoš: This is a task that will probably not be doable. We will have to manage with what we have. After all, it is a matter of political assessments and decisions. The Armed Forces do not plan the budget; they do not prioritize where the money should go. We did a lot in the past several years to bring out the maximum from what we had, and as I have already mentioned somewhere, we even managed to increase salaries after a long period, through internal savings, economical management. The budget did not increase as much as to allow such a raise in salaries. With smaller budget, it is likely that the level of personnel expenditures will remain a considerable portion of that budget. The raise of the military pensions, which are a part of the defense budget is no longer under the control of the Ministry of Defense, it is linked to the ways of civilian pensions. The level of operational expenditures must go up because it simply makes no sense to keep servicemen in barracks, arriving to work and going back to their homes in the afternoon, I am talking about officers and servicemen who actually do not do anything. This is simply unacceptable, and at the end of the day, the investments will again suffer the most. We will not be able to invest to acquire new equipment that we need, after so many years of not investing and not renewing the equipment.
B92: As far as I understand, the conscription will not be abolished in 2010 as originally planned?
Ponoš: I only pointed out that it was not realistic, that we cannot increase the number of professional servicemen; we could employ several thousand people with decent salaries if we conducted professionalization of the Armed Forces. It means that the budget allocated to defense would return to the economy through employment. We will probably have to keep conscription with such reduced budget. This is an option where we spend money, we train soldiers during six months and then we send them back home. Practically, what is invested is not returned the way it would happen if we had full professionalization. As I have mentioned earlier, the government must decide on what they want and the Armed Forces must manage any option, in one way or another. After all, we do not have many opportunities to be asked for our opinion, but it is very important to know what is ultimately expected from us, because you cannot have both the reduced budget and more efficient and larger Armed Forces.
B92: Is it clear to you what they want from the Armed Forces?
Ponoš: Is it clear to you?
B92: I am a journalist, it is important that it is clear to you.
Ponoš: Well, I think there is a bit of confusion, it is clear that in a transition society there are many priorities, the government is a coalition, there are many different things important to many different people and we are aware of that. We only want to point out that we have an important role in the society, that the military is not an isolated institution within which things happen without anyone knowing about them. I believe that we are one of the most open, transparent institutions in Serbia at this moment. It is easy to see where we spend money, what we do, at least in the part controlled by the General Staff, I can fully guarantee that. I believe that it is the same in the Ministry of Defense, so let us say - if we have that money, we can do this and that, and if we do not have that money, than we cannot do it. As I have always emphasized, it is not up to the military to say what to do, but how to do it, it is a professional matter. If we get less money, then we should say to politicians – we cannot do that with that amount of money.
B92: And what cannot you do now with this money?
Ponoš: We cannot conduct professionalization.
B92: Which means – how long will conscription last?
Ponoš: Let us see how the budget for this year will finally look like. After all, we will see how it will go in 2010 and 2011; it is just a framework within which we act.
B92: I saw that you have job announcements for more than 2000 vacancies in the Armed Forces. Is the reduced budget going to affect that as well?
Ponoš: The jobs are for contract soldiers.
B92: Is it going to affect their salaries and the number of people that you will be able to employ?
Ponoš: Certainly, it is a process that had a good start, that campaign had a good start. Now we have around 1700 candidates who applied, several hundred women have applied for military service, to wear uniforms and do that job. I think it had a good start because we were on the way to change the image of the Armed Forces, to make the military profession attractive again. It is clear that it will be more difficult with lower salaries.
B92: During the several last weeks, the question about the soldiers who were killed in Topcider has been brought up again. We had the new report and if I understood Mr. Zoric correctly, there will be a new investigation. To what extent do the Armed Forces and you as the Chief of the General Staff insist on solving the case, because it is something that really burdens the Armed Forces? I have heard many people saying that it is, among other things, a reason why they prefer to serve the national service as civilians, because their parents are worried.
Ponoš: As the Chief of the General Staff, I am not in a position to insist on such things, this is a judicial matter, no internal military agencies can deal with it any more, they simply do not have the authority. But it is certain that, apart from the parents, there is no one as much interested to find out the truth as we are, because we carry that weight, current servicemen in the Armed Forces. This is something that will always pose problems to our public image if we do not find out the truth. You are right when you say that it also makes problems to people who are to serve in the military. It remains an unresolved problem in their minds. It is very important to us that this is resolved; I would like that to happen as soon as possible.
B92: Yes.
Ponoš: The truth can be the only solution, and what we have now, different interpretations, lawyers’ games, former judges, that does not solve anything. We have this topic that emerges from time to time in the public, and we do no not know the truth.
B92: At the end of the interview, let us get back to the question from the beginning. When do you expect the experts could gather and discuss the initiative for possible revision of the Kumanovo Agreement?
Ponoš: I proposed to General Craddock that it would be good, in the following several weeks, to send an expert team to Belgrade. Meanwhile, we also had some technical communication which I used in order to renew the proposal, so hopefully it will be possible in a few weeks, we should have the team here. Of course, General Craddock will probably have to obtain the political mandate for such things, too. I already have the political mandate to start with such discussions. So, we have agreed that we should start talking, we will see how far we are going to get, I cannot specify the time when we will have some results, how long it is going to take, what the outcome would be. But NATO has shown willingness, readiness and understanding that our requests are military reasonable and acceptable.
B92: To what extent has the security situation in the south of Serbia influenced the idea of revising the Kumanovo Agreement and abolishing the buffer zone?
Ponoš: Well, this is all a complex question, which is only one part of the setting. I have pointed out at the beginning of our conversation that many things have changed; some new players have shown up on the other side of the administrative line. Our relations with NATO have evolved throughout these years. The security situation is not worse than it was in 2000, I would say that it is much better. Back then we had a rebellion, there was suspicion between us and NATO and we do not have that now. We are present in Brussels, we will soon open our mission there, we have signed the agreement on security of information, and we attend NATO exercises. We will have a major NATO exercise in Serbia next year, although it will be a medical exercise. All these things indicate a new quality of our relations, we cannot concentrate only on the past, and many things have changed.
B92: Thank you for being in Kaziprst. This was Radio B92 Kaziprst and Chief of the General Staff, Zdravko Ponoš.
Ponoš: I initiated the issue of the revision of the Kumanovo Agreement some ten days ago in Brussels and elaborated on it at the meeting with Admiral Fitzgerald last week in Naples. Ten days altogether is not enough time to expect a reaction at the ministerial level and to change agenda of their meetings, so I am not optimistic it will be one of the topics at the meetings at that level. However, it is important that the initiative has been registered, it has entered the system and naturally, what follows is political consultations. My task and my idea was to raise the issue at the military level, with people whom I communicate to, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Craddock, and the Commander of the Allied Joint Force Command Naples, Admiral Mark Fitzgerald.
B92: We read from the news that you said that there was a possibility that experts could meet in the upcoming two weeks. What experts?
Ponoš: I proposed that to General Craddock, that it was the best way to start the process, to gather experts from both sides and discuss what changes would make sense, and what would be military reasonable and acceptable to both sides. That means that I count on NATO military structures, SHAPE, and officers form the SAF General Staff.
B92: Whose idea was that in the first place, the idea to revise the Agreement?
Ponoš: The issue has been present in the General Staff, in expert circles, as a problem that needed to be discussed, because the situation was simply untenable. The issue was raised in an appropriate political moment, of course, the military cannot raise a subject independently, we can make a proposal to those who have the authority and political power to say ‘It is time’.
B92: And who assessed when was the right political moment?
Ponoš: The president of Serbia, of course.
B92: And then you officially brought up the idea?
Ponoš: That is correct, because I have the authority to talk with NATO military structures and that is what I did. My visit to Brussels was not about that issue, I attended the session of the Euro Atlantic Partnership Military Committee, and there I gave a presentation on cooperation between the SAF and KFOR. That was an opportunity to point out everything that was good during all these years since 1999, and also what was bad, and to point out that we faced damage control in some aspects. When I say that, I mean that KFOR entered into a process of building or assisting in building of the so called Kosovo Security Forces and I pointed out the need for some things to be changed in the field, in this case, along the administrative boundary line on our side.
B92: We have not heard the NATO opinion about that idea, but when you presented the idea, I suppose at the meetings, did they nod, did they agree?
Ponoš: The generals showed understanding because I used military reasons, so to say. My argument was that the situation in the field had been changed, lets say…
B92: What?
Ponoš: …Kosovo and Metohija administrative line. The fact is that the Ban Ki Mun report was accepted and now UNMIK is being reconfigured, EULEX is coming, we have a new security constellation in that sense. Another fact is that the so called Kosovo Security Forces are being established, with NATO participation. A new security entity is emerging, one that had not been anticipated at the time of signing of the Kumanovo Agreement and UN Resolution 1244. The situation is that after all these years that we, i.e. SAF and before that Serbian and Montenegrin Armed Forces, managed to build a relationship based on trust with NATO in Kosovo and Metohija, i.e. KFOR. Since 1999, when we were two opposed parties, in war, we managed to create a situation where we jointly organized sports events, conducted joint patrols. All that indicated a high level of confidence and understanding, i.e. the part of the story that relates to what was happening in the field. If so, is there really a need to have some buffer zone between such forces?
B92: All right, but what does the buffer zone have to do with, for example, to be specific, establishing of EULEX?
Ponoš: Well, EULEX was neither anticipated nor discussed at the moment of signing the Kumanovo Agreement and Resolution 1244. I am talking about the change of the security constellation that occurred during these past ten years, and many things have changed. The perception of Serbia in the West has changed and probably the perception of the West in Serbia, as well. We are facing a control of emotions and they are facing the need to control the inertia of politics that was present during all those years. The political aspect of the entire story is that, in the meantime, Serbia acceded to Partnership for Peace. Partners should not have military buffer zones between each other.
B92: But you say that we no longer have the partnership relations with NATO as we used to have?
Ponoš: I said that I could no longer promote partnership with KFOR Commander at the moment when KFOR performs a task which, in our opinion, is not in accordance with Resolution 1244. That is why I cancelled meetings at that level with KFOR HQ, but, on the other hand, it is very important that we understand that the situation in the field is changing, that something is still going on there, that those Kosovo Security Forces are being established. We are angry, but this anger must not be to our own detriment.
B92: Do you consider those KSF as a threat to Serbia?
Ponoš: No, at this moment everything that they imply… to our knowledge, establishing those security forces, of 2500 lightly armed personnel, that means they are more gendarmerie type forces than military, but with the possibility to grow into 5000 personnel in the foreseeable time, if that is conducted in accordance with the Ahtisaari plan, and to evolve into something that would certainly be unacceptable.
B92: What is unacceptable?
Ponoš: Well, it is not acceptable that some new security forces in the region, that are not foreseen by any regional agreement on arms control or some wider context of the arms control in the region should be established, regardless of whether it is 5.56 or 7.62 caliber or some bigger, there is some new formation wearing uniforms…
B92: All right, that means that you actually do not believe that NATO-KFOR-the international forces would prevent establishing Kosovo Army?
Ponoš: We cannot engage in guessing what if. At this moment, we have a problem which is politically unacceptable for Serbia, because it is not endorsed by Serbia, unlike the EULEX mission, which comes as a mission endorsed by Serbia. In fact, there are two processes, the processes of UNMIK reconfiguration and of coming of EULEX are conducted with participation of Serbia, which provided its opinion, it has been acknowledged in line with Resolution 1244, but the establishment of the so called KSF was not done in consultation with Serbia, but on the basis of the Ahtisaari plan. This is not acceptable for Serbia, and we continuously point out that it is not a way to build partnership.
B92: All right, and now you request that the buffer zone should be abolished? What is the effect and what does it mean?
Ponoš: We want to have an active role in the entire process, and this is a part of that active role.
B92: What does an active role mean?
Ponoš: The active role is, as I have said, the story where we oppose it, we are angry, but the situation is still developing in that direction and we still have a static role and we are still angry. This is simply not politically wise, that is why we want to have an active approach, so we say - There is something happening ten years after the war, and we think that the requirements have been met to change provisions of the agreement that regulated the procedures on either side of the ABL. I do not know if our citizens are aware of the fact that it is not only that we do not have the full sovereignty over our southern province Kosovo and Metohija, which covers a certain percentage of the Serbian territory, we actually do not even have, in full sense, the sovereignty over as much territory when we look at the size of the Air Safety Zone, where our fighter planes cannot fly. After all relaxations, such procedures are still enforced. We can only fly helicopters up to 5 km and even then, they can only be lightly armed, 7.62, and even if it is a medical helicopter, the flight has to be approved by the KFOR Commander. After ten years, it is something that cannot remain, it cannot be politically justified and interpreted as partnership.
B92: What is the effect of the abolishment of the buffer zone in the military sense? What does it practically mean?
Ponoš: In the military sense, it means full freedom of movement and full sovereignty over that part of the Serbian territory.
B92: So the sovereignty up to the border, the administrative crossing?
Ponoš: That is not…yes, up to the administrative line.
B92: Which means what, you are going to…?
Ponoš: It means that we can deploy our military forces, move, fly our aircraft up to that line without asking the KFOR Commander for any permission, because, as you would agree, it is not natural that KFOR Commander should have authority, not only over the territory of Kosovo, but also outside the line in the 25 km depth, ten years after the war. Imagine Europe in 1955 and a situation where provisions of some agreements made at the end of the war were still implemented, and compare the authority of the KFOR Commander today, ten years after the war, with the authority of, say, general McArthur in Japan several years after the war, it simply makes no sense.
B92: Why is it important that you have the control in that buffer zone, in terms of security?
Ponoš: Well, because it is a volatile area, it is widely known that there are no security problems in Kosovo and Metohija or on our side of the ABL that strictly remain only on that side. Every time there is security turmoil, it overflows. Finally, the nature of those security problems is such that they are not conventional military threats, it is organized crime, religious extremism and other forms of extremism. And there are always both legal and illegal businesses developing along borders and along administrative lines, as well. The important thing is that Serbian institutions are capable of…
B92: Is it a military job to control organized crime and such?
Ponoš: Indirectly, as the second line of defense, yes, it is, just as KFOR job in Kosovo is to fight all risks when UNMIK, until now and EULEX, from now on, cannot manage them. Actually, we used to have such situation in 2000, when there was a rebellion in the Ground Safety Zone, when our forces got the authority to enter the GSZ, because on the other side, NATO was aware that the option of having one area not controlled by the military, but only lightly armed police was a great risk to security on the other side of the ABL too. I think that we have a good offer to make to the other side, we offer cooperation…
B92: And who is the other side in this case, is it KFOR?
Ponoš: KFOR, of course.
B92: What is the offer?
Ponoš: We offered them to raise the level of cooperation and we will do that if we do not look at each other from the distance of 5, 10 or 25 km, to ask approval so we can move our forces in that area. Of course, it does not imply directly that we intend to bring five battalions there, there is no such need, but simply, it is not normal to have limits in that zone ten tears after the war.
B92: Yes, but say that the security is volatile, but relatively peaceful, and that Serbia is perceived differently by the west then it was in 1999. What are your predictions, if it is important to you to come out to the administrative line? What are the prognoses or predictions of the military, if it is important to you to bring the military to the administrative line?
Ponoš: It is certainly very important to us that the SAF can control the Serbian territory and in this case, the political sense and tactfulness tell us that the control can reach the ABL. That is also a sovereignty issue.
B92: But why did you not request that in 2007?
Ponoš: It was probably not politically possible at that moment; we did not have such political momentum. We believe that we have patiently built our position over the past years, built quality and reliable relations with our European and Euro Atlantic partners, with Brussels in both cases, of course. And we have demonstrated everywhere, in practice, that we observe the assumed international obligations. In the past four years we have not had a single, even unintentional violation of that line on our side, there have been some on KFOR side, but we have understanding even for that, they change their forces each 6 months, and deploy new contingents.
B92: What is your security assessment?
Ponoš: It is possible to control security situation in Kosovo and Metohija, I have just mentioned the security risks I see there. You have probably noticed that I have not mentioned a single pure military threat or a need to resolve it by the military, any military, not even KFOR, inside Kosovo and Metohija, because the situation can be controlled politically and by security agencies and police, because of the nature of such problems. It can be the same on this side; however, if someone can gain political profit by causing a problem, then the problem can escalate into something much bigger. Actually, we have had such experience. If, in foreseeable time, ordinary people become aware that, after ten or twelve months, the self-proclaimed independence brought no change in the quality of their lives, they will realize that they cannot live purely on independence. If institutions are not functional, if the unemployment rate remains high, we cannot rule out the possibility of the political authorities redirecting attention of the ordinary population to some security problems; after all, we have had such experiences not only in that region, but also in many other regions in the world.
B92: Is that your military assessment?
Ponoš: It is one of the possibilities we point out to and it is very important to have full and open cooperation with international forces and military and civilian actors in Kosovo and Metohija in order to control such things.
B92: How, in what way would the military control that area? Would they enter the North of Kosovo or not?
Ponoš: At this moment, this is certainly not a subject of discussion. As I have said, we should be tactful and politically realistic. What can we do at this moment? If we regain, to use that rather strong word, the sovereignty, full sovereignty over that part of our territory, of 25 km in the depth of the southern part of the central Serbia, up to the administrative line itself, that alone would be a big step, we have not had a full sovereignty there for ten years.
B92: All right, it is 5 km now, as far as I understand.
Ponoš: Well, yes, but KFOR Commander still has the authority to say that he will not allow something or to bring back everything to the beginning. As I have said, our Air Force cannot fly even in this 25 km zone.
B92: What kind of communication do you have with KFOR Commander now, and also with NATO leaders, having in mind that the level of communication was reduced after the decision…?
Ponoš: I think that it was a misunderstanding. I cancelled high level meetings with KFOR Commander, which was a direct message because of the KFOR engagement. Our relations are complex, not limited to relations with KFOR only; we are also a member of the Partnership for Peace. Therefore, I maintained communication in Brussels with the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Admiral Di Paola, with SACEUR, General Craddock, and the Commander of the Allied Joint Force Command Naples, Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, but not with KFOR Commander. However, we still have technical possibilities to communicate, we have the established protected lines from my office to his and in case of any problem, we can just pick up the receiver and talk.
B92: It means that your visit to Brussels was part of the regular activities, but not bringing back the previous level of communication?
Ponoš: But my visit to Naples was not part of the regular activities, and that is why I accepted the meeting with KFOR Commander’s superior, Admiral Fitzgerald, and KFOR Commander also participated in the meeting.
B92: All right, but how do you intend to discuss the idea concerning the Ground Safety Zone if you do not have communication?
Ponoš: Well, of course I do. As I have said, I have invited the expert team from NATO HQ to come; they are two levels above KFOR.
B92: You say that the Armed Forces are making security assessments on what could happen and that you now have such prediction by 2015. Does the prediction include the possibility that Kosovo Security Forces could grow into Armed Forces?
Ponoš: There are security assessments that indicate that the situation in Kosovo and Metohija and around it will remain volatile in an extended period of time, that the presence of international military forces is necessary to keep the situation under control, that it is important to us to have partnership with those military forces and good relations in order to avoid local forces evolving into something that would be difficult to control, something that would disrupt the security in the entire region. Nothing that could happen there would remain only within the administrative line. What is the point? Simply, security problems usually come as a result of some social problems. It is not realistic to expect that the living standards, stabilization of any local institutions, education level, inter-ethnic tolerance in Kosovo and Metohija would soon change.
B92: What is actually the strategy, in the military-political sense, of the initiative to abolish the buffer zone? What is the final goal?
Ponoš: We should not discuss the final goals; after all, nothing is finite. We are talking about the direction, and I think that we have a good direction.
B92: And what is that direction?
Ponoš: The direction means building good relations with Europe, with Brussels, in this case with NATO as well, not only with the European Union, through the partnership, for which we have obtained references with our conduct during he past ten years, and by sharing the responsibility for the security situation in the field. We want to play an active role in that, it is our right, it is about our lives, our destiny.
B92: But how do you mean to build confidence if you do not have trust in NATO, because NATO assists in establishing KSF?
Ponoš: The point is that they are doing something that we do not think is in accordance with Resolution 1244, and we are indicating that.
B92: What is the difference between…?
Ponoš: Well, we have been insisting on transparency in what they do, even if it is contrary to our positions, to see whether there is any sense or legal basis to do so. Staying aside is not a solution. As I have said, we are saying: We would like to know what is going on, so that we can act accordingly. We expect transparency from NATO because we act transparently.
B92: Is the abolishment of the ground zone the only change in the Kumanovo Agreement that you request, or you intend to propose changes to some other parts of the Agreement?
Ponoš: We have two zones, we have both ground and air zones and very broad authorities of KFOR Commander to bring all things back to the starting positions in 1999, and that is the serious problem. Of course, there are things that pertain to the security of civil flights, the issue of the civil flights control over both the territory of the southern part of the central Serbia and the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. Before the war, we used to have radar on Kopaonik that was destroyed in the war, and the radar has not been brought back there, we have not had understanding from NATO concerning that, and we point out that it is not a military issue; it is an issue of political good will.
B92: And is the authority of NATO Commander a political or military issue?
Ponoš: It is both; NATO is more than military organization.
B92: As a matter of fact, you request that the authorities that we agreed on should be abolished?
Ponoš: It is not about abolishing the authorities; it is about revising parts of the agreement that do not make sense anymore, after ten years.
B92: It means that it does not make sense that KFOR Commander should…
Ponoš: …regulate, have any authorities on this side of the administrative line. Of course, that is our starting position, we will see how far we will go through discussions, I cannot predict the outcome, but I do think that, at least in the military part of NATO, there is understanding that our requests are grounded, sensible, justified. We will see whether there will be understanding and good will in NATO political structures.
B92: If the SAF want the Air and Ground Safety zones abolished, and to reach the administrative line, to regulate their action and forces there by themselves, does it mean that you have an assessment or prediction or idea that we have some security threats against our country from there?
Ponoš: It would be the same if you asked me why we need sovereignty and freedom in accordance with the international standards for the SAF along the Drina River, or along the Romanian or Bulgarian border. Does it mean that we are threatened from there?
It does not mean that, it is not implied, but that is a question of sovereignty in case of any country.
B92: But why is it important to you, as a soldier?
Ponoš: Because we do not have it there, the soldier’s job is to secure a sovereignty of their country in the part where it does not exist. At this moment, it makes sense to request that along the administrative line.
B92: What about the increase of the number of personnel that was announced, does it coincide with emerging KSF or is it an idea that does not have anything to do with any circumstances?
Ponoš: It has to do with that, as well, of course.
B92: What does it have to do with that?
Ponoš: As I have said, establishment of any military structure, although as I have mentioned, it is not a serious military structure, disturbs the regional balance of forces, and that is something which should require consultations with Serbia or asking for our opinion, whether it is the right thing. After all, it is completely unacceptable to us that it should be performed on the basis of the Ahtisaari plan; to us it is simply unacceptable framework, both politically and legally.
B92: All right, but Kosovo has been recognized by several countries and it builds its internal organization. Why is it…?
Ponoš: The fact that it has been recognized by several countries still does not mean that…
B92: 52 countries.
Ponoš: Yes, Kosovo does not have a chair in the UN, but let us leave that aside now. Establishment of such forces is not as military important as it is politically, it sends a political message…
B92: What kind of message?
That it is a state, that it has institutions, one of the characteristics of a state is the monopoly on the use of force. The paradox of the situation will become clear from the fact that once that forces are created, the so called state will not have the monopoly on the use of force, the key to it will still be held by someone outside Pristina.
B92: Well, what kind of message is that to you, as a soldier?
Ponoš: I am talking about political…after all, it is not my decision to increase the armed forces, it is a matter of political assessment of the President of the Republic. Just as that is a political message, that some forces are being created there, this too, is a political message that Serbia can react, that Serbia will play an active role both in a situation when it is asked for an opinion, and participates in something, but also in a situation when it does not participate. As I have said, in the case of UNMIK reconfiguration, Serbia was active in that process, and now Serbia has been left outside of the process.
B92: What kind of political message are we sending when we increase the number of military personnel? I saw in one of your assessments that, among other things, we are sending a message.
Ponoš: We are sending the message that Serbia will, in any case, whether it participates in the political process, discussions or not, play an active role and take care of its own destiny.
B92: And what does the active role mean in the military sense?
Ponoš: The active role means that we, in the context of neutrality, which is currently, in a way, the Serbian foreign or military policy, cannot rely on allies; it means that you need to have your own resources. You cannot build the so called niche capabilities where you have something, while you rely on your allies to provide what you do not have. We do not have an ally at this moment; it is simply not the official policy. If you do not have that, you have to get everything yourselves, it costs, and the cost is the increased number of personnel.
B92: Does the prediction of what could be happening until 2015, in terms of security, include consideration of division of Kosovo, and the possibility of the division of Kosovo or participation of the Armed Forces in that?
Ponoš: As long as it is not the official state policy, the Armed Forces cannot make plans in accordance with that. All our plans are based on the official state policy, and as you know, division of Kosovo is not an official policy.
B92: But I am asking you about the prediction, not the official policy, is there such a possibility?
Ponoš: The Armed Forces are outside the foreign policy, and we predict what the others will do, not what the Serbian government will do.
B92: All right.
Ponoš: We should know what the government does in Serbia.
B92: And do you know that?
Ponoš: Of course.
B92: Mr. Ponoš, the division of Kosovo is being frequently mentioned in the political circles these days, and it is being connected to EULEX, even this revision of the Kumanovo Agreement is being put into that context in Kosovo. However, we read assessments of several politicians from this region that division of Kosovo could mean war. I ask you as a soldier: Do you think that it could mean that, among other things?
Ponoš: Well, any option where I should guess what something should mean is simply unacceptable, given my current position. If I were a university professor, then I could accept such kind of conversation.
B92: Mr. Ponoš, the budget rebalance cut money for the Armed Forces by 3 billion dinars. What kind of information do you have regarding the defense budget, in the light of the proclaimed general reductions?
Ponoš: The predictions are not optimistic. There is some information that has already appeared in the media that it will be around 71 billion or around 806 million euros. That is a reduction by around 60 million euros, compared to the defense budget for 2008, which is certainly not good.
B92: And how do you plan to increase the Armed Forces with the reduced budget?
Ponoš: Well, I would also like to know how that can be done with the reduced budget.
B92: And what does it tell you, as the Chief of the General Staff, how will you act in the upcoming period, what will be your capabilities?
Ponoš: This is a task that will probably not be doable. We will have to manage with what we have. After all, it is a matter of political assessments and decisions. The Armed Forces do not plan the budget; they do not prioritize where the money should go. We did a lot in the past several years to bring out the maximum from what we had, and as I have already mentioned somewhere, we even managed to increase salaries after a long period, through internal savings, economical management. The budget did not increase as much as to allow such a raise in salaries. With smaller budget, it is likely that the level of personnel expenditures will remain a considerable portion of that budget. The raise of the military pensions, which are a part of the defense budget is no longer under the control of the Ministry of Defense, it is linked to the ways of civilian pensions. The level of operational expenditures must go up because it simply makes no sense to keep servicemen in barracks, arriving to work and going back to their homes in the afternoon, I am talking about officers and servicemen who actually do not do anything. This is simply unacceptable, and at the end of the day, the investments will again suffer the most. We will not be able to invest to acquire new equipment that we need, after so many years of not investing and not renewing the equipment.
B92: As far as I understand, the conscription will not be abolished in 2010 as originally planned?
Ponoš: I only pointed out that it was not realistic, that we cannot increase the number of professional servicemen; we could employ several thousand people with decent salaries if we conducted professionalization of the Armed Forces. It means that the budget allocated to defense would return to the economy through employment. We will probably have to keep conscription with such reduced budget. This is an option where we spend money, we train soldiers during six months and then we send them back home. Practically, what is invested is not returned the way it would happen if we had full professionalization. As I have mentioned earlier, the government must decide on what they want and the Armed Forces must manage any option, in one way or another. After all, we do not have many opportunities to be asked for our opinion, but it is very important to know what is ultimately expected from us, because you cannot have both the reduced budget and more efficient and larger Armed Forces.
B92: Is it clear to you what they want from the Armed Forces?
Ponoš: Is it clear to you?
B92: I am a journalist, it is important that it is clear to you.
Ponoš: Well, I think there is a bit of confusion, it is clear that in a transition society there are many priorities, the government is a coalition, there are many different things important to many different people and we are aware of that. We only want to point out that we have an important role in the society, that the military is not an isolated institution within which things happen without anyone knowing about them. I believe that we are one of the most open, transparent institutions in Serbia at this moment. It is easy to see where we spend money, what we do, at least in the part controlled by the General Staff, I can fully guarantee that. I believe that it is the same in the Ministry of Defense, so let us say - if we have that money, we can do this and that, and if we do not have that money, than we cannot do it. As I have always emphasized, it is not up to the military to say what to do, but how to do it, it is a professional matter. If we get less money, then we should say to politicians – we cannot do that with that amount of money.
B92: And what cannot you do now with this money?
Ponoš: We cannot conduct professionalization.
B92: Which means – how long will conscription last?
Ponoš: Let us see how the budget for this year will finally look like. After all, we will see how it will go in 2010 and 2011; it is just a framework within which we act.
B92: I saw that you have job announcements for more than 2000 vacancies in the Armed Forces. Is the reduced budget going to affect that as well?
Ponoš: The jobs are for contract soldiers.
B92: Is it going to affect their salaries and the number of people that you will be able to employ?
Ponoš: Certainly, it is a process that had a good start, that campaign had a good start. Now we have around 1700 candidates who applied, several hundred women have applied for military service, to wear uniforms and do that job. I think it had a good start because we were on the way to change the image of the Armed Forces, to make the military profession attractive again. It is clear that it will be more difficult with lower salaries.
B92: During the several last weeks, the question about the soldiers who were killed in Topcider has been brought up again. We had the new report and if I understood Mr. Zoric correctly, there will be a new investigation. To what extent do the Armed Forces and you as the Chief of the General Staff insist on solving the case, because it is something that really burdens the Armed Forces? I have heard many people saying that it is, among other things, a reason why they prefer to serve the national service as civilians, because their parents are worried.
Ponoš: As the Chief of the General Staff, I am not in a position to insist on such things, this is a judicial matter, no internal military agencies can deal with it any more, they simply do not have the authority. But it is certain that, apart from the parents, there is no one as much interested to find out the truth as we are, because we carry that weight, current servicemen in the Armed Forces. This is something that will always pose problems to our public image if we do not find out the truth. You are right when you say that it also makes problems to people who are to serve in the military. It remains an unresolved problem in their minds. It is very important to us that this is resolved; I would like that to happen as soon as possible.
B92: Yes.
Ponoš: The truth can be the only solution, and what we have now, different interpretations, lawyers’ games, former judges, that does not solve anything. We have this topic that emerges from time to time in the public, and we do no not know the truth.
B92: At the end of the interview, let us get back to the question from the beginning. When do you expect the experts could gather and discuss the initiative for possible revision of the Kumanovo Agreement?
Ponoš: I proposed to General Craddock that it would be good, in the following several weeks, to send an expert team to Belgrade. Meanwhile, we also had some technical communication which I used in order to renew the proposal, so hopefully it will be possible in a few weeks, we should have the team here. Of course, General Craddock will probably have to obtain the political mandate for such things, too. I already have the political mandate to start with such discussions. So, we have agreed that we should start talking, we will see how far we are going to get, I cannot specify the time when we will have some results, how long it is going to take, what the outcome would be. But NATO has shown willingness, readiness and understanding that our requests are military reasonable and acceptable.
B92: To what extent has the security situation in the south of Serbia influenced the idea of revising the Kumanovo Agreement and abolishing the buffer zone?
Ponoš: Well, this is all a complex question, which is only one part of the setting. I have pointed out at the beginning of our conversation that many things have changed; some new players have shown up on the other side of the administrative line. Our relations with NATO have evolved throughout these years. The security situation is not worse than it was in 2000, I would say that it is much better. Back then we had a rebellion, there was suspicion between us and NATO and we do not have that now. We are present in Brussels, we will soon open our mission there, we have signed the agreement on security of information, and we attend NATO exercises. We will have a major NATO exercise in Serbia next year, although it will be a medical exercise. All these things indicate a new quality of our relations, we cannot concentrate only on the past, and many things have changed.
B92: Thank you for being in Kaziprst. This was Radio B92 Kaziprst and Chief of the General Staff, Zdravko Ponoš.
